Changing Museum Visitors’ Conceptions of Evolution

Free-choice learning, which takes place in environments such as museums or science centers, differs from formal learning in that it is “self-directed, voluntary, and guided by individual needs and interests” (Falk and Dierking 2002, p. 9). Formal education, in contrast, has a given format, particular prerequisites, obligations, and constraints. Educators working in environments designed for free-choice learning have recently begun more rigorous work to examine and understand the learning that occurs in these settings. In the last decade, theoretical models on learning in museums have incorporated personal, contextual, and socio-cultural variables to provide a framework within which to investigate and interpret learning in free-choice environments (Bell et al. 2009; Vadeboncoeur 2006). Moreover, there is evidence to indicate that science learning in museums is mediated by these identified variables (Adelman et al. 2000; Anderson et al. 2000; Bamberger and Tal 2007; Falk and Storksdieck 2005; Falk and Adelman 2003). A recent review of museum visitor studies on the topic of evolution, however, has found that most have not been framed theoretically but instead focused on elements such as visitor interest, visitor understanding of terms, and visitor acceptance of evolutionary concepts (Spiegel et al. 2006). These studies revealed that museum visitors are more accepting of evolution than is the general public (People for the American Way 2000; Stein and Storksdieck 2005) and are also more accepting of non-human evolution than human evolution (Hayward et al. 1996; Pawlukiewicz et al. 1990; Spiegel et al. 2006). In addition, these studies identified a high level of visitor interest in evolution topics (Borun 2002; Stein and Storksdieck 2005). However, visitor understanding of terms was limited and frequently contained misinformation indicating use of alternative conceptions (Borun 2002; MacFadden et al. 2007; People, Places, and Design Research 1992; Squire and Hubbell Mackinney 1996).

The current study of visitor learning at an evolution exhibition is informed by a theoretical framework that includes elements of the free-choice learning models integrated within a constructivist model that incorporates the intuitive beliefs that visitors bring to the learning process (Evans 2008; Evans, et al. 2010). While lack of acceptance of evolution stems in part from strongly held religious beliefs (Evans 2008; Mazur 2005; Numbers 1992), lack of understanding may also be explained by the intuitive reasoning processes that both children and adults use to make sense of everyday biological events (Evans 2000, 2001; Gregory 2009; Sinatra et al. 2008). In the current paper, we argue that one reason that evolutionary concepts are so difficult to learn is because of initial cognitive biases that appear early in childhood and that continue to exert their influence on adult reasoning (Bloom and Weisberg 2007; Evans 2000, 2001, 2008; Evans et al. 2010). These early-emerging intuitive reasoning patterns include the essentialist intuition that species are unique and stable, as well as the intuition that any changes within species are goal directed and intentional (Keil 1994; Kelemen 1999; Gelman 2003; Mayr 1982; Medin and Atran 2004; Wellman and Gelman 1998). Evolutionary explanations are counterintuitive, probably more so than most complex scientific explanations, because they challenge this commonsense understanding of the natural world (Evans 2000, 2001, 2008; Sinatra et al. 2008). Natural phenomena, including living things, constantly change and, further, this change is neither purposeful nor directed toward a specific end-point.

In the conceptual model that we are utilizing, these intuitive reasoning processes provide the foundation for reasoning about evolutionary problems. Over time, these intuitions become interconnected with the system of beliefs, practices, and values that comprise the socio-cultural practices that are part of everyday experiences (Evans 2000, 2001). This process shapes the beliefs that visitors bring to an exhibition on evolution. In the U.S., in particular, individuals are influenced by two potentially divergent cultural frameworks: Christian fundamentalist creationist beliefs that may support or even extend these intuitive reasoning patterns; and scientific models, which typically do not (Evans 2008; Evans et al. 2010). Our theoretical model includes the intuitive beliefs of the museum visitor, the belief systems to which the visitor subscribes, the visitor’s personal interests, and the particular context of the museum exhibition in the current study: “Explore Evolution.”

The current study was designed to assess the extent to which the “Explore Evolution” exhibition contributes to conceptual change (Carey 1985; Sinatra et al. 2008; Vosniadou 2008) in visitors’ reasoning about evolution. In previous research (Evans 2005; Evans et al. 2010) prior to the installation of the “Explore Evolution” exhibition, adult museum visitors were presented with scenarios describing changes in the seven organisms presented in the exhibition. Visitors were asked open-ended questions about how these changes occurred. The interviewers refrained from mentioning evolution as a possible mechanism. For example, participants were told that the first few fruit flies arrived on the Hawaiian Islands several million years ago and now there are 800 different species, and then asked explain how this happened. The explanations given by the museum visitors in their responses to each of the seven evolutionary problems were transcribed and coded. Of particular interest was whether museum visitors would spontaneously invoke evolutionary ideas. Responses that included themes from the intuitive reasoning patterns, described earlier, were categorized as intuitive or novice naturalistic reasoning; responses that included themes from the Darwinian model (such as the VIST Framework) were categorized as evolutionary or informed naturalistic reasoning; whereas those that expressed supernatural concepts were categorized as using creationist reasoning.

In this initial study, it was found that even in a sample of well-educated museum-going adults, not one visitor invoked the evolutionary reasoning pattern for all seven organisms, and overall, just over a third of the sample (38%) demonstrated a reasonable grasp of evolutionary concepts. All of the participants combined intuitive and evolutionary reasoning patterns, while a minority also used creationist reasoning. Mammals and birds were more likely than microorganisms or invertebrate species to invoke the evolutionary reasoning pattern. Twenty-eight percent endorsed creationist explanations for human origins, although only six percent were consistently creationist across all seven organisms.

This foundational study provided evidence for the argument that intuitive cognitive biases found in early childhood persist in adulthood, even in well-educated populations interested enough in natural history to visit museums. An example of an essentialist bias was found in the refusal to acknowledge that biological change of this magnitude occurred: New species could not have emerged from ancestral forms (Evans et al. 2010). Reminiscent of similar explanations found in children’s responses (Evans 2000, 2001), some adults would use what is called proximate-cause reasoning, proposing instead that the apparently new organism had always existed and could be found someplace else.

In the same study, a distinction was drawn between two kinds of goal-directed or teleological explanations (Evans 2000; Southerland et al. 2001): (1) desire- or want-based explanations, which imply that the organism has free will and can intentionally change its body parts to adapt to the environment, such as, “the animal changes because it wants (desires) to,” and (2) need-based explanations: “the animal changes because it needs to.” The latter may cite or implicate an animal’s intrinsic needs—that the changes are deemed necessary for survival—without referencing conscious mental states such as desire (Evans et al. 2010). The results of the latter study suggested that the ability to disassociate need-based from desire-based reasoning is an important step, with need-based reasoning providing a foundation for an initial grasp of evolutionary reasoning. Younger elementary school children are more likely than older children to use desire-based explanations of evolutionary change (Evans 2000). In contrast, adults are more likely to use need-based explanations (Evans et al. 2010). Typically, individuals who endorse either of these explanations describe species change in terms of individual change (Bishop and Anderson 1990). The rabbit, for example, acquires white fur because it needs to or wants to hide from predators, subsequently passing on this acquired trait to future generations. Pre-existing variability within species is ignored. In this way, the essentialist intuition that each kind (or species) has an immutable essence is maintained. In contrast, Darwinian evolutionary concepts challenge these intuitions: species are ever-changing, and while those changes are sometimes adaptive, they are not directed toward the goal of surviving in a particular environment.

In the current study, the research questions focused on how museum visitors might change their reasoning patterns as a result of a naturalistic visit to the “Explore Evolution” exhibition. Although museum-goers are less likely to be creationist than the population at large (Spiegel et al. 2006), they are not, as described above, well informed about evolution (Evans et al. 2010; Macfadden et al. 2007). As such, they provide a useful population to assess which aspects of evolutionary thinking, if any, are absorbed in a single visit to an evolution exhibition. The current focus, therefore, is on measuring incremental change in visitors’ reasoning patterns.

As well as examining change in the use of evolutionary explanations, we were particularly interested in whether exposure to the exhibit would result in a decrease of one or both intuitive explanations: need-based and desire-based reasoning. This study uniquely assessed this relationship using closed-ended questions, providing a more accurate measure of change than can be obtained with open-ended questions, such as those used in the earlier study (Evans et al. 2010). This measure gave visitors the opportunity to endorse one or both explanations independently of each other, which permits a more nuanced analysis of their relationship. If, as suggested by the earlier pattern of findings as well more recent work with younger children (Legare et al. 2012), need-based (but not want-based) reasoning acts as a “bridge” to evolutionary understanding (Evans et al. 2010, p. 348), then it should be positively associated with evolutionary reasoning and either remain stable or increase from pre- to post-assessment. In addition, we examined the differences between child and adult reasoning patterns and the relationship among the socio-cultural, personal, and contextual variables included in the study. Three instruments were used: (1) a closed-ended questionnaire based on themes that emerged in an analysis of the open-ended questions in the earlier study, described above (2) a subset of items from the earlier open-ended instrument, and (3) measures of visitors’ beliefs, personal and demographic variables, and time spent at and interest in the exhibition.

Based on the earlier study (Evans et al. 2010) we expected to find that most museum visitors’ explanations of evolutionary processes would comprise a mixture of different reasoning patterns. In particular, we predicted that as a function of exposure to the exhibition (1) use of the evolutionary reasoning pattern would increase. Furthermore, we predicted (2) a disassociation between the three intuitive explanations, with desire-based and proximate cause, but not need-based (goal-directed) reasoning, decreasing. In addition, we predicted (3) that visitors’ beliefs, in particular, whether they endorsed a creationist or an evolutionist perspective, would influence their receptivity to the exhibition material, with creationist reasoners being the least likely to change. Finally, we predicted (4) that the age of the visitor would influence receptivity to the materials, with child visitors being more likely to endorse intuitive and creationist reasoning patterns and older visitors more likely to endorse evolutionary reasoning patterns.

These findings demonstrate that a single visit to an interactive exhibition on evolution effects positive though incremental change in museum visitors’ understanding of evolution, regardless of the beliefs, interests, or age of the visitor. Given the self-selection of the volunteer sample, this is an important finding. This study was undertaken to further our understanding of how an exhibition on evolution might influence visitors’ reasoning. While museum visitors are more likely than the population at large to be highly educated and knowledgeable about science (Korn 1995), they still hold alternative conceptions, using intuitive and creationist reasoning to explain evolutionary change (Evans 2005, 2008; Macfadden et al. 2007). In keeping with our first research prediction, even though this sample of visitors increased their endorsement and expression of evolutionary ideas, they still maintained some aspects of the intuitive reasoning patterns that they held prior to the visit, albeit at lower levels of endorsement.

Evolution is a controversial topic that is misunderstood by many U.S. citizens. While it is unlikely that a single visit to a museum exhibition would elicit transformational changes in reasoning about this topic, incremental changes are critical steps along a visitor’s educational journey. Although the overall change we measured in this study was incremental rather than transformational, this change did occur for over 90% of the visitors on the closed-ended questionnaire. Understanding the nature of these incremental changes can help us learn how to foster those skills that may lead to more radical change over time (Vosniadou 2008; Vosniadou et al. 2008), as well as how to foster such changes in populations who might be less interested in natural history, or ideologically opposed to evolutionary ideas. We address the nature of those changes in the next sections. Moreover, we consider a further issue central to an understanding of informal and formal science learning: Why was the exhibition successful? We suggest that the critical component was the nature of the exhibition itself, which included unique elements that contributed to the learning of a difficult and controversial topic. Additionally, our measures were constructed to be sensitive to a fine-grained analysis of explanation change.

This study demonstrates that museum exhibitions can contribute to the public’s understanding of evolution. Whatever their age and background beliefs, the visitors in our sample learned more about evolutionary concepts in a single visit to an evolution exhibition. One important question that remains is whether these findings can be extended to informal and formal learning experiences for a broader spectrum of the public.

The differences between the somewhat more positive results we find in this study and the findings reported from semester-long courses in schools and colleges can be explained in several ways. Importantly, our criteria for success were modest. Therefore, in contrast to interventions in more formal settings (e.g., Bishop and Anderson 1990; Banet and Ayuso 2003; Passmore and Stewart 2002), we asked whether incremental change had occurred, not whether visitors could explain natural selection without the use of intuitive terminology. It is also important to note that consistent with research in formal settings, we did not find that visitors had abandoned their intuitive explanations, just that they were less likely to endorse anthropomorphic reasoning, and more likely to endorse need-based explanations as well as evolutionary explanations. Nor did we investigate change in a broad range of misconceptions; recent studies by Nehm et al., for example, have identified “force-talk” as a compelling intuitive explanation (Nehm et al. 2010b). In terms of the public understanding of science, however, our modest expectations are more realistic (Falk et al. 2007). Additionally, our instruments were developed in a two-stage process and were very sensitive to subtle changes in explanatory structure because, unlike open-ended instruments, they allowed visitors to endorse each type of explanation independently of the others.

From the perspective of conceptual change theory (Sinatra et al. 2008), one issue this study highlights is that the use of multiple explanatory systems is normative (Evans 2005; Evans et al. 2011; Nehm et al. 2010a). Visitors shifted effortlessly between evolutionary, intuitive, and creationist explanations as the circumstances dictated, often endorsing multiple explanations concurrently. These findings imply that conceptual change may often be achieved by fine-tuning a particular explanatory system, rather than supplanting intuitive or creationist explanations with evolutionary ones. This is an important finding. It suggests that the task of teaching evolution should not necessarily be viewed as a struggle to identify and supplant intuitive misconceptions (e.g., Gregory 2009). Rather it is more of an organic process in which evolutionary explanations emerge out of earlier intuitive ideas, especially need-based explanations; however, the latter are maintained but used in a more restricted manner than before.

This suggestion, that need-based reasoning may represent a transition point rather than a misconception, challenges the current consensus that it is an impediment to learning (e.g., Bishop and Anderson 1990; Nehm et al. 2010a; Nehm and Schonfeld 2008; Southerland et al. 2001). Our argument, however, is simply that not all forms of teleological reasoning are equally problematic. The realization that out of necessity an organism needs to change to survive in a particular environment and that this change cannot be achieved intentionally is an important step, we propose, in a learning progression (e.g., Duncan and Hmelo-Silver 2009) from intuitive to evolutionary reasoning (Evans et al. 2012). Moreover, the changes we observed in visitors’ reasoning are consistent with both historical (Mayr 1982; Quammen 2006) and ontogenetic patterns of change (Evans 2000; Legare et al. 2012).

Our goal in the current study was to discover whether measurable learning can occur in a single museum visit. It does. Nevertheless, future research should verify whether this learning is retained and whether this kind of exposure can jump start students’ understanding. For museum visitors and students who do not realize that evolutionary principles apply to all living things, even a short immersion in an experience such as “Explore Evolution” could be a crucial step toward convincing them otherwise. Presenting contemporary evidence for evolution across diverse organisms, from the virus to the whale, seems to be an effective way of educating the public that evolutionary concepts apply to all living organisms.